UA-69458566-1

Tuesday, April 23, 2024

Iran Update, April 23, 2024

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida called on April 23 for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan to escalate.[1] Abu Obeida called on the “Jordanian masses” to escalate their actions and “raise their voice” against Israel.[2] Jordanian demonstrators in Amman chanted references to Abu Obeida shortly after Hamas released his speech.[3] Pro-Palestinian protests in Jordan and around the Middle East have frequently celebrated Obeida and have sometimes responded to his calls for demonstrations. Some demonstrators have ascribed special significance to his words, especially in the first months of the Israel-Hamas war.[4] Jordanian protests had decreased in frequency, size, and scope in recent daysuntil Obeida’s speechdue to arrests and protester fatigue.[5] Abu Obeida‘s praise for the Jordanian protest movement as “the most important“ masses against Israel mirrors the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) military spokesperson’s statement of support for the Jordan protest movement on April 4.[6]

Abu Obeida’s call for Jordanians to take a more active role against Israel is consistent with the Iranian desire to expand its militia networks into Jordan. A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia threatened to create and arm a new 12,000-man Iranian proxy in Jordan on April 1, which CTP-ISW assessed may reflect a greater, more confrontational, shift in the Iranian strategy vis-a-vis Jordan.[7] Such a militia is likely aspirational and not currently a feasible undertaking, but Abu Obeida’s speech could be meant to spur participation and organization along these lines. Tehran and its regional allies seek to expand their position in Jordan because Jordanian territory could grant them land routes through which to transfer materiel into the West Bank as well as a possible opportunity to disrupt Israeli overland trade through the kingdom. An active and well-armed Iranian-backed militia based out of Jordan would also significantly advance Iran’s military encirclement of Israel.

Abu Obeida’s praise of Jordan notably focused on the “Jordanian masses” not the Jordanian state, which is consistent with Iran and its Axis of Resistance increasingly criticizing and threatening Jordanian political leadership for its Israel policy in recent months. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah specifically criticized Jordanian leaders on April 15 for supporting the US and Israeli interception of the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[8] IRGC-affiliated media separately warned Jordan that it would be Iran’s “next target” if it supported an Israeli strike into Iran.[9] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also called for the dismantlement of Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan, on which Israel has increasingly relied to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign in the Red Sea.[10]

Key Takeaways:

  • Jordan: Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida called for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan to escalate.
  • Gaza Strip: An unspecified Israeli security official reiterated to the Wall Street Journal the Israeli intent to conduct a clearing operation in Rafah.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller confirmed that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia recently attacked US forces in Syria.
  • Iran: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian traveled to St. Petersburg, Russia, to attend the 12th Russian International Security Summit.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued to conduct targeted raids in the northern Gaza Strip. Elements of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Kfir Brigade (99th Infantry Division) launched a raid targeting military infrastructure and tunnel shafts in Beit Hanoun on April 22.[11] A Palestinian journalist furthermore claimed that Israeli forces advanced toward the center of Beit Hanoun.[12] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah—separately fired “machine guns” and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun on April 22.[13]

The IDF has conducted multiple raids targeting Palestinian militias in Beit Hanoun in recent weeks.[14] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Palestinian militia cells remain present in Beit Hanoun.[15] This assessment is consistent with the Wall Street Journal citing an unidentified Israeli defense official on April 22 saying that there are “several thousand” Palestinian fighters remaining in the northern Gaza Strip.[16] The IDF Southern commander met with forces in Beit Hanoun to discuss fighting in the area on April 23.[17]

The IDF issued new evacuation orders for Beit Lahia on April 23 ahead of Israeli operations there.[18] IDF spokesperson Avichay Adraee reported that the IDF will target Palestinian military infrastructure and “subversive elements” in the area.[19] A Palestinian journalist reported on April 23 that Israeli forces began shelling north of Beit Lahia.[20]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations around the Netzarim corridor on April 23. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) ambushed and killed several Palestinian fighters with sniper fire.[21] The Nahal Brigade also directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure.[22] The IDF reported that multiple secondary explosions occurred while destroying Palestinian military infrastructure, suggesting weapons storage facilities were present.[23]

The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) and Air Force targeted Palestinian fighters near a civilian shelter near al Bureij in the central Gaza Strip on April 23.[24]

Palestinian militias have mortared Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip at least four times in the northern and central Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 22. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces in and around Jabalia.[25] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared Israeli forces west and southwest of Gaza City.[26]

An unidentified Israeli security official reiterated to the Wall Street Journal the Israeli intent to conduct a clearing operation in Rafah.[27] The Israeli official stated that the IDF has a “tight operational plan” but did not elaborate further. The official added that Israel is preparing to implement a “humanitarian response” for its clearing operations into Rafah.[28] Egyptian officials briefed on the Israeli plans claimed that Israel will establish food-distribution centers, medical facilities, and tent shelters in Khan Younis and relocate Palestinian civilians from Rafah to Khan Younis and other unspecified areas of the Gaza Strip. The Associated Press (AP) published on April 23 an analysis of satellite imagery showing an enclave of newly constructed tents in Khan Younis.[29] AP cited a Palestinian health official who claimed that the tents are meant for Palestinian civilians currently sheltering in a hospital and are “not related to any impending military operation.”[30] The same Egyptian officials claimed that the civilian evacuations to Khan Younis would take two to three weeks to complete.

Hamas rejected US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recent assertion that Hamas is preventing a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[31] Blinken said on April 19 that Hamas rejected a “generous proposal” from Israel and asserted that Hamas is more interested in a regional war than a ceasefire.[32] Hamas rejected the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal on April 13, just hours before Iran’s large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel.[33] Blinken added that Hamas is “the only thing” preventing a ceasefire in Gaza.[34] Hamas responded to Blinken on April 23, claiming that it has “offered flexibility” but added that it has not changed its demands since December 2023.[35]

Palestinian militias conducted at least five indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on April 23. PIJ conducted two rocket attacks, including a combined attack with the Ansar Brigades, targeting Sderot.[36] The al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades and National Resistance Brigades conducted a combined rocket attack targeting the IDF Zikim base.[37] Israeli forces targeted and destroyed indirect fire launch sites Beit Lahia and Gaza City in Beit Lahia and Gaza City.[38] The IDF Air Force also destroyed two indirect fire launch sites in the southern Gaza Strip that the IDF says were prepared to launch further attacks into Israel.[39] PIJ and the National Resistance Brigades conducted separate rocket attacks targeting Nir Am.[40]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 22.[41] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in separate attacks in Jericho and Nablus.[42] Israeli forces separately engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid near Jenin.[43]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 22.[44] The IDF intercepted a Hezbollah drone near Acre on April 23.[45] Hezbollah said that the drone was targeting the IDF Golani Brigade’s headquarters north of Acre.[46] Israeli Army Radio said that this drone interception near Acre was the first since December 2023.[47] The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting unspecified Hezbollah "military infrastructure” in Yaron, Aita al Shaab, and Blida.[48]

The IDF reported separately on April 23 that it killed three Hezbollah officers involved in air defense and the drone unit in Hezbollah’s Radwan forces.[49]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller confirmed on April 22 that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia recently attacked US forces in Syria.[50] Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters launched at least five rockets targeting US forces at the Rumaylan Landing Zone in northeastern Syria on April 21.[51] Miller described the attack as “especially troubling” given that it occurred hours after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani returned from the United States to Iraq.[52] Kataib Hezbollah reportedly announced on April 21 that it had resumed its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria, although it later denied making such a claim.[53] CTP-ISW assessed on April 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in the Middle East.[54]

The Iraqi federal government concluded on April 23 that the recent explosion at a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters originated from the headquarters' “ammunition and explosives storage area.”[55] The explosion occurred at the PMF Kalsu Headquarters in Babil Province on April 19.[56] The Iraqi federal government emphasized that the explosion was not caused by a missile attack and that no drones or fighter jets were in Babil Province’s airspace “before, during, or after” the explosion.[57]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian traveled to St. Petersburg, Russia, on April 23 to attend the 12th Russian International Security Summit.[58] Ahmadian met with Iraqi National Security Adviser, Qasem Araji, on the sidelines of the summit on April 23.[59] Araji emphasized the importance of expelling US and international coalition forces from Iraq. Ahmadian and Araji also discussed the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders.[60] Ahmadian will also meet with his Brazilian, Chinese, Indian, Russian, and South African counterparts during his visit to Russia.[61]

The Chechen Republic appears to be trying to align itself more closely with Iran over the backdrop of intensifying bilateral security cooperation between Russia and Iran. Russian State Duma Deputy and head of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch Adam Delimkhanov stated on April 22 that he met with Ahmadian during a visit to Iran on Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s orders.[62] Delimkhanov reported that he and Ahmadian discussed security issues in Central Asia and the Middle East and the prospects of Russo-Iranian cooperation in countering national security threats to both states. Iran is pursuing its own interests in the North Caucasus, especially Muslim-majority regions, and is likely interested in strengthening bonds with Chechen officials to expand its influence in the region. Representatives of Iranian airline Mahan Air met with Chechen Prime Minister Muslim Huchiev in December 2023 to discuss the prospect of opening regular flights between Chechnya and Iran to strengthen trade, economic, and cultural ties between the two.[63]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Gen. Asim Munir in Islamabad on April 22.[64] The two discussed regional stability and increasing cooperation between the Iranian and Pakistani armed forces. Raisi is conducting a three-day visit to Pakistan, marking his first visit there since Iran and Pakistan exchanged fire across their border in January 2024.[65] Raisi’s visit follows a dramatic uptick in anti-regime militancy and terrorist activity in southeastern Iran near its border with Pakistan.[66] Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militiaconducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting the Iranian security services in Sistan and Balochistan Province, Iran, on April 4.[67]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed recent anti-Israel protests on Western college campuses during a speech in Lahore, Pakistan, on April 23.[68] Raisi criticized the “lack of free thought” in Western college campuses due to the expulsion of university students involved in anti-Israel protests.[69] IRGC-affiliated media published multiple articles praising the anti-Israel protests on US college campuses on April 23.[70]

Hardline Iranian parliamentarian Javad Karimi Ghodousi tweeted on April 23 that Iran would test a 12,000 km-range missile within one week if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei grants permission.[71] This tweet followed Ghodousi’s previous tweet on April 22 that implied that Iran could test a nuclear bomb, rather than a missile, within one week.[72] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi stated on April 23 that the normalization of talk about nuclear weapons is “absolutely deplorable.”[73]

The Iranian regime has reemphasized its commitment to enforcing its mandatory hijab law domestically. The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) unveiled a new plan on April 13 that would further compel Iranian women to adhere to the hijab requirement.[74] The plan, called Tarah-e Nour, includes the activation of a “new enforcement body” to confront unveiled women in public in “a more serious manner.”[75] The plan also further enables Iranian authorities to fine and arrest unveiled women.[76] Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei instructed the judiciary to “help” the LEC implement Tarah-e Nour on April 22.[77] Law Enforcement Commander Brig. Gen. Ahmad Reza Radan affirmed on April 23 that the LEC will continue to implement Tarah-e Nour with “strength, precision, and intelligence” and with support from the Iranian parliament, judiciary, and the Raisi administration.[78] Radan also stated that Tarah-e Nour is moving towards “intelligentization,” referring to the Iranian regime’s efforts to use advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and facial recognition, for enforcement activities.[79] Iranian social media users recently reported that some Iranian universities are using facial recognition technology to identify unveiled female students.[80]

 


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[2] https://t.me/hamasps/20066

[3] https://twitter.com/tathaqaf50/status/1782820207335010380 ; https://tw...

[4] https://english dot almayadeen.net/news/politics/jordan-witnesses-massive-protests-hailing-gaza--yemeni-missi ; https://www.alamy.com/palestinian-protesters-holds-up-portraits-of-abu-o... https://twitter.com/PalinfoAr/status/1727780791311036418

[5] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/21/tightrope-jordans-balancing-act...

[6] https://t.me/sarayaps/17638 ; https://t.me/hamasps/20066

[7] https://t.me/abualaskary/118%C2%A0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024

[8] https://www.kataibhezbollah dot me/news/3369

[9] https://twitter.com/FarsNews_Agency/status/1779271226755617106

[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-9-2024 ; https://t.me/abualaskary/118

[11] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782822138904228156

[12] https://t.me/hamza20300/233429

[13] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6314

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2024 ; h...

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2024

[16] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-moves-closer-to-rafah-invas...

[17] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782822157124293005

[18] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1782762346739343591

[19] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1782762346739343591

[20] https://t.me/hamza20300/233585 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/233571 ; ht...

[21] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782667510875083028

[22] www dot idf.il/193674

[23] www dot idf.il/193674

[24] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782667514834530633

[25] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6318 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6120

[26] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1911 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17696

[27] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-moves-closer-to-rafah-invas...

[28] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-moves-closer-to-rafah-invas...

[29] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-hamas-latest-04-23-2024-7eb0c352b...

[30] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-hamas-latest-04-23-2024-7eb0c352b...

[31] https://t.me/hamasps/20059

[32] https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-solo-press-availab...

[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-rejects-israels-ceasefir...

[34] https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-solo-press-availab...

[35] https://t.me/hamasps/20059

[36] https://t.me/sarayaps/17694 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/49187 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17697

[37] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4202 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782830004163825983

[38] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782830007359881658

[39] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782667458177859871

[40] https://t.me/sarayaps/17694 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4204

[41] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6316 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6315 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/233415

[42] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6315 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6316

[43] https://t.me/hamza20300/233415

[44] https://t.me/mmirleb/3467 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3471 ; https://t.me...

[45] https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1782721809147703301 ; https://twi...

[46] https://t.me/mmirleb/3467

[47] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1782724098423963808

[48] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1782740494193140170 ; https://twit...

[49] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1782707274026229789 ; https://twi...

[50] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-april-22-2024/

[51] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/21/iraq-rockets-syria-us-mili...

[52] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-april-22-2024/

[53] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/21/iraq-rockets-syria-us-mili...

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2024

[55] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Probe-into-camp-Kalsu-blast-points-to-internal-explosion

[56] https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/19/middleeast/iraq-explosion-military-base-i...

[57] https://alghadeertv dot iq/archives/271656

[58] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073839

[59] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85454735

[60] https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=299491

[61] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/03/3073043

[62] https://t.me/adelimkhanov_95/2719

[63] https://chechnyatoday dot com/news/371503

[64] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073384; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/662930/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073379; https://president dot ir/fa/151333 ; https://twitter.com/PakistanFauj/status/1782602365880746410

[65] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-22-2024 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/iranian-president-lands-pakistan-three-day...

[66] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2024

[67] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/16/3063220; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/16/3063239; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-4-2024

[68] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073672 ;

[69] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073672 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/20/nyregion/arrested-columbia-students-s...

[70] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073765; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073377; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/03/3073297

[71] https://twitter.com/Jkarimi_ir/status/1782682696180695173

[72] https://twitter.com/Jkarimi_ir/status/1782314854377824618 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-22-2024#_edn8...

[73] https://www.dw.com/en/irans-nuclear-activities-raises-eyebrows-at-iaea/a...

[74] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202404148645;

https://abcnews.go.com/International/iran-israel-war-hijab-crackdown/sto...

[75] https://www.rferl.org/a/iranian-commander-new-morality-enforcement-body/...

[76] https://www.rferl.org/a/iranian-commander-new-morality-enforcement-body/...

https://abcnews.go.com/International/iran-israel-war-hijab-crackdown/sto...

[77] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/662830/

[78] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/04/3073488

[79] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-18;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january...

[80] https://t.me/Sedaye_Alzahra/87

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2024

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Annika Ganzeveld, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 23, 2024, 6:20pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted ongoing Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City and announced Russia’s intent to intensify its strike campaign to disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Shoigu addressed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) collegium on April 23 and focused on the recently claimed Russian seizure of Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[1] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have seized all of these settlements yet, however. Shoigu also focused on claimed Russian gains northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka.[2] Russian forces have yet to make significant tactical gains near Chasiv Yar after advancing up to the eastern outskirts of the settlement in early April 2024 but have recently made significant tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka and marginal advances southwest of Donetsk City.[3] Shoigu is likely trying to broadly depict the various ongoing Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine as equally successful despite mixed and limited tactical Russian success in these directions.[4] Russian forces will likely intensify ongoing offensive operations in the coming weeks to exploit Ukrainian materiel constraints ahead of the expected arrival of US security assistance.[5] Shoigu’s focus on Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, west of Avdiivka, and west and southwest of Donetsk City further indicates that Russian forces will likely intensify assaults in these areas, where Russian forces are currently prioritizing broader offensive operations, instead of elsewhere along the front.

Shoigu also announced that Russian forces will intensify strikes against Ukrainian logistics centers and storage facilities for Western-provided weapons.[6] Russian forces have heavily targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure during missile and drone strikes through March and April 2024, exploiting already degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in an effort to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid and cause long-term damage to Ukrainian war waging capabilities and public morale.[7] Russian forces will likely intensify drone and missile strikes in the coming weeks to maximize damage to Ukrainian infrastructure and defense industrial base capacity before the expected arrival of US security assistance begins to alleviate Ukraine’s critical shortage of air defense missiles.[8] Shoigu’s focus on striking Ukrainian logistics suggests that Russian forces may shift their target set to hit Ukrainian transportation infrastructure, logistics, and military storage facilities. Russian forces heavily targeted Ukrainian transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 19, and Russian forces may intend to replicate and expand these strikes in the coming weeks to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[9] The Russian military command may hope that a coordinated interdiction effort will constrain Ukraine’s ability to sufficiently distribute manpower and materiel to critical sectors of the front and delay the improved capabilities that the arrival of US security assistance will afford Ukrainian forces.[10]

Shoigu also discussed ongoing Russian military reforms during his April 23 MoD collegium address, cloaking ongoing expansion efforts in an information operation meant to falsely frame all Russian military activity as inherently defensive and responsive to supposed NATO aggression.[11] Shoigu claimed that Russian forces would continue efforts to improve their composition and structure “in proportion to the threat” posed by the United States and its allies — echoing a standard Kremlin information operation that frames the West as a constant aggressor and Russia as a passive victim trying to defend itself against external attacks. Shoigu went on to discuss the Russian military’s ongoing efforts to stand up the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD) and accused Sweden of increasing tensions on Russia’s northwestern and western flanks through its accession to NATO. Shoigu also reported that the 44th Army Corps (AC) has formed within the LMD (potentially naming the AC that Russian forces have been forming in the Republic of Karelia on the border with Finland, which borders the LMD’s new area of responsibility) and confirmed that Russia is expanding three unspecified motorized rifle brigades into motorized rifle divisions.[12] Kremlin officials have frequently claimed that Finland’s NATO accession forced Russia to create the LMD on Finnish borders, and Shoigu’s suggestion that routine NATO defensive exercises and responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine necessitate the sort of long-term Russian military buildup that Russia is currently undertaking are both continuations of the longstanding Kremlin narrative that Russia is an innocent victim of aggressive NATO expansion.[13] Ongoing Russian military reforms and expansion are likely meant to prepare Russia for a potential future conventional confrontation with NATO, but the Russian attempt to justify the reforms as inherently passive and reactionary is an information operation that likely aims to force NATO states to self-deter from increasing their own defensive capabilities.[14]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian traveled to St. Petersburg on April 23 to attend the 12th Russian International Security Summit.[15] The Iranian Embassy in Moscow announced that Ahmadian will meet with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev while at the summit.[16] Ahmadian met with Iraqi National Security Adviser, Qasem Araji, on the sidelines of the summit on April 23, where Araji emphasized the importance of expelling United States and international coalition forces from Iraq. The two also discussed the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders. Ahmadian will also meet with his Brazilian, Chinese, Indian, Russian, and South African counterparts at the summit. High-level meetings between Iranian and Russian defense officials such as Ahmadian and Patrushev help both sides align their national security and defense strategies and bolster Russia’s informational reputation as the leader of a coalition of like-minded states that counterbalance the West.

The Chechen Republic appears to be trying to align itself more closely with Iran over the backdrop of intensifying bilateral security cooperation between Russia and Iran. Russian State Duma Deputy and head of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch Adam Delimkhanov stated on April 22 that he met with Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian during a visit to Iran on Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s orders.[17] Delimkhanov reported that he and Ahmadian discussed security issues in Central Asia and the Middle East and the prospects of Russo-Iranian cooperation in countering national security threats to both states. Iran is pursuing its own interests in the North Caucasus, especially Muslim-majority regions, and is likely interested in strengthening bonds with Chechen officials to expand its influence in the region. Representatives of Iranian airline Mahan Air met with Chechen Prime Minister Muslim Huchiev in December 2023 to discuss the prospect of opening regular flights between Chechnya and Iran to strengthen trade, economic, and cultural ties between the two.[18]

United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced the UK’s largest ever package of military assistance to Ukraine valued at 500 million pounds (around $662 million) on April 23.[19] Sunak announced on April 23 that the UK will provide over 400 vehicles, 4 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 60 boats, air defense equipment, and Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine. Sunak also stated that the UK will increase its military spending to 2.5 percent of its GDP by 2030, with spending gradually increasing to 87 billion pounds (about $108 billion) in the next six years.[20] Sunak stated that the increased defense spending will put the UK “on a war footing” as the UK is facing an “axis of authoritarian states with different values...like Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.”[21]

Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23, and the opposition politicians likely intended to use to bribe protestors and voters. Moldovan law enforcement officers conducted over 150 searches mostly at the Chisinau airport and in some personal homes after receiving a tip that opposition politicians who were returning from the April 21 meeting of Moldovan opposition politicians in Moscow, which resulted in the creation of the pro-Russian Moldovan Victory electoral bloc, were smuggling money into Moldova.[22] Moldovan authorities reported that they confiscated about 62,000 rubles (about $660), 3,000 euros (about $3,200), and over $1.1 million during the searches. The Moldovan General Police Inspectorate Chief Viorel Cernauteau stated on April 23 that the money was meant to finance Moldovan political parties led by affiliates of US-sanctioned, pro-Kremlin Moldovan politician Ilan Shor. Unspecified actors reportedly used “couriers” to transport the money from Russia to Moldova and promised them compensation ranging from 300 to 500 euros (about $320-520). Cernauteau noted that the “couriers” carried under 9,000 euros (about $9,600) of cash to avoid customs laws which require people to declare amounts over 10,000 euros (about $10,700). Shor reportedly paid demonstrators to protest Moldovan President Maia Sandu in 2022, and Moldovan authorities are investigating the Shor Party for bribing voters during the 2023 Gagauzia gubernatorial election.[23] Moldovan authorities have also detained members of Moldovan parliament who reportedly took bribes from Shor affiliates.[24] ISW previously assessed that the creation of the Victory electoral bloc would allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort as part of its efforts to destabilize Moldovan society, attack Moldova’s democratic government, and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).[25]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is blocking 150 virtual private network (VPN) services in Russia, another step in the Kremlin’s efforts to further censor and control the Russian information space. Rozkomnadzor Department for Control and Supervision Head Yevgeny Zeitsev announced during a speech at the Safer Internet Forum in Moscow on April 23 that Roskomnadzor is currently blocking 150 popular VPN services and that Roskomnadzor began restricting access to websites and social media posts that advertised VPNs on March 1, when a federal ban on advertising ways to bypass Roskomnadzor’s restrictions came into effect.[26] Zeitsev stated that Roskomnadzor has blocked roughly 700 sites that advertised VPNs since March 1 and 200,000 sites accused of spreading false information about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since February 2022. The Russian government has previously attempted to downplay its efforts to block VPNs, although the Kremlin appears increasingly unwilling to tolerate VPN usage that allows Russians to bypass censorship efforts amid ongoing efforts to further consolidate control over the Russian information space.[27]

Ukrainian drone strikes and recent flooding in Russia have reportedly brought weekly Russian oil refining to an 11-month low, although the decrease in refining output has so far been marginal.[28] Bloomberg reported on April 22 that as of mid-April 2024 Russia processed 5.22 million barrels of crude oil per day, 10,000 fewer barrels than the average in early April.[29] Russia has reportedly processed 1.23 million barrels of crude oil per day since January at refineries that Ukrainian forces previously struck with drones, a 280,000-barrel-per-day decrease from before Ukrainian forces started targeting Russian oil refineries in late January 2024.[30] Ukrainian drone strikes reportedly shut down 14 percent of Russia’s overall oil refining capacity as of April 2.[31] Flooding in Orenburg Oblast forced the Orsk oil refinery to go offline on April 7, but Reuters reported that the Orsk refinery resumed full operations on April 23.[32] Decreased Russian refining capacity likely forced Russia to import gasoline from Kazakhstan and Belarus in early April to address shortages and attempt to prevent domestic gasoline prices from rising, although there are no indications that constraints on Russian gasoline production are significant to international market values.[33] Russian officials have noted that a reduction in primary oil refining in 2024 will likely lead to increases in Russian crude oil exports since Russia would not be able to refine as much as it usually does.[34] Future Ukrainian drone strikes may disable and disrupt more of Russia’s refining capacity and inflict critical constraints on Russian refining that begin to substantially impact Russia’s production of distillate products. Ukrainian drone strikes have yet to significantly impact Russian refining production or the domestic Russian or international supply of crude oil and distillate products, however.

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted ongoing Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City and announced Russia’s intent to intensify its strike campaign to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.
  • Shoigu also discussed ongoing Russian military reforms during his April 23 MoD collegium address, cloaking ongoing expansion efforts in an information operation meant to falsely frame all Russian military activity as inherently defensive and responsive to supposed NATO aggression.
  • Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian traveled to St. Petersburg on April 23 to attend the 12th Russian International Security Summit.
  • The Chechen Republic appears to be trying to align itself more closely with Iran over the backdrop of intensifying bilateral security cooperation between Russia and Iran.
  • United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced the UK’s largest ever package of military assistance to Ukraine valued at 500 million pounds (around $662 million) on April 23.
  • Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23, and the opposition politicians likely intended to use to bribe protestors and voters.
  • Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor is blocking 150 virtual private network (VPN) services in Russia, another step in the Kremlin’s efforts to further censor and control the Russian information space.
  • Ukrainian drone strikes and recent flooding in Russia have reportedly brought weekly Russian oil refining to an 11-month low, although the decrease in refining output has so far been marginal.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) and Russian forces recently advanced near Donetsk City.
  • Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the ineffectiveness of Russian drones on the battlefield.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces maintained a relatively intensified rate of ground attacks between Svatove and Kreminna on April 23 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks northwest of Svatove near Berestove; southwest of Svatove near Nadiya, Novoyehorivka, and Hrekivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[35] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked southwest of Kreminna near Hryhorivka.[36] Elements of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[37]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction (northwest of Bakhmut) on April 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian attacks east of Siversk near Zolotarivka and Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka.[38] Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near the Vyimka-Rozdolivka area (south of Siversk).[39]

 

Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions east of Chasiv Yar as Russian forces continued offensive operations in the area on April 23. Geolocated footage published on April 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar).[40] Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed that elements of the “Akhmat” Spetsnaz and the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) captured several Ukrainian positions on the western outskirts of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and the “Sarmat” battalion of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) “Pyatnashka” international volunteer brigade attacked the eastern outskirts of Chaisv Yar.[42] One Russian milblogger urged Russian forces to prioritize seizing the Novyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar instead of continuing what they described as tactically insignificant efforts to advance towards Chasiv Yar from Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[43] Positional engagements continued near Bohdanivka, in the Novyi Microraion, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chaisv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[44] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that the Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Novopavlivka (west and southwest of Donetsk City) directions are currently the most intense directions in eastern Ukraine.[45]

 

Russian and Ukrainian sources continued to debate the extent of claimed Russian advances northwest of Avdiivka on April 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Most Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), although some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have more limited positions in the southern half of the settlement and that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the western outskirts.[46] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces had penetrated a Ukrainian defensive line that reportedly stretches from Ocheretyne to Netaylove (northwest to southwest of Avdiivka), including one Russian milblogger who claimed that Russian forces had advanced as far as five kilometers in depth past the Ukrainian defensive line in Ocheretyne.[47] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces emphasized that Ukrainian forces still control the majority of Ocheretyne and maintain fire control over the southern part of the settlement where Russian forces are attempting to advance, however.[48] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces also stated that Russian forces are using all available means and weapons, including unspecified chemical weapons, to advance near Ocheretyne.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to and within Novobakhmutivka (northwest of Avdiivka and just south of Ocheretyne) and that Ukrainian forces are withdrawing from positions in central Novobakhmutivka and Solovyiove (northwest of Avdiivka).[50] ISW has not yet observed evidence of Russian forces operating in, or Ukrainian forces withdrawing from, Novobakhmutivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces do not currently control Novobakhmutivka, but claimed that Russian forces will likely capture Novobakhmutivka and Solovyiove in rapid succession.[51] Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Keramik, Novokalynove, Berdychi, and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Netaylove.[52] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD), and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Ocheretyne.[53]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued fighting in the area on April 23. Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[54] Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) planting a flag in western Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced further westward in the settlement. [55] Russian milbloggers reiterated claims on April 23 that Russian forces seized Novomykhailivka.[56] The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces stated that Russian forces are committing a large number of forces to operations aimed at breaking through the Ukrainian line near Novomykhailivka.[57] A Ukrainian commander serving in the area stated that Russian forces have concentrated roughly 10 unspecified units, including two brigades and several regiments, in the area and are conducting more than 10 assaults with infantry and heavy equipment daily.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced within Heorhiivka (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[59]

 

Fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on April 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that likely elements of the Russian 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Territorial Troops [TRV]) advanced up to 200 meters in depth east of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[60] Fighting continued near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are unsuccessfully attacking southwest of Staromayorske and south of Urozhaine.[62] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are transferring elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) to the area, which Mashovets stated indicates the Russian military command's intent to resume operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Volodymyrivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[63]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne) in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 23.[64] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a kilometer in depth near Robotyne, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[65] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], and Southern Military District [SMD]) and likely elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[66]

 

Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on April 23.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified offensive operations within Krynky but did not specify the size or character of the Russian assaults.[68] Likely elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD], formerly Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating near the Dnipro River in the Kherson direction.[69]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 22 to 23. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Belgorod Oblast and 16 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and Kursk Oblast.[70] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces downed 15 Shahed drones over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kyiv, and Cherkasy oblasts.[71] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City with an unspecified type and number of missiles and Odesa City with a drone.[72] Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces used different tactics during the Shahed strikes by launching one or two Shahed drones in different directions at different frequencies.[73] Yevlash added that Russian Shahed drones were likely attempting to conduct reconnaissance on the deployment of Ukrainian mobile fire groups.[74]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the ineffectiveness of Russian drones on the battlefield. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are preventing Russian forces from conducting effective assaults near Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are complicating Russian offensive operations in the Zaporizhia Oblast direction.[75] The milblogger complained that Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction in Donetsk Oblast have far fewer drones than Ukrainian forces and that most Russian drones fail to reach their intended targets. The milblogger complained that Russian commanders are ordering their subordinates to not report problems with drones to higher command and that the Russian military is not providing soldiers with the necessary resources to resolve these issues. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger agreed with the first milblogger, claiming that these problems are not new.[76] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the main supplier of Russian first-person view (FPV) drones has a monopoly on production so Russian forces only have one main model of FPV drone. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have long known the frequencies on which this model of drone operates and are jamming them. Another Russian milblogger who previously fought in occupied Ukraine made similar complaints on April 22 about Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) threatening Russian FPV drones that operate on the same frequency.[77] The Russian government designated the State Transport Leasing Company as the sole supplier of drones under government contracts for 2024 through 2025 on April 16.[78]

A Ukrainian military observer reported that leaked documents and emails indicate that Russian agricultural companies RusAgro and AssistAgro, which are connected to Russian oligarch Vadim Moshkovich, are assisting in the manufacturing processes for drones for the Russian military under the cover of their registration as agricultural enterprises.[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Deputy General Director for Scientific and Technical Development of the Russian state-owned Almaz-Antey Corporation Sergei Druzin stated on April 23 that Almaz-Antey specialists can change algorithms for anti-aircraft missile systems directly at the systems’ locations to improve their counter-drone capabilities.[80]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russia is furthering efforts to forcibly absorb occupied Ukraine into the Russian economic sphere. The Kremlin previously introduced a “free economic zone” (FEZ) in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts in June 2023, which introduced special insurance and tax benefits for participating enterprises starting on January 1, 2024.[81] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 23 that since the FEZ began operating, Russian occupation authorities have forcibly nationalized over 37 enterprises in occupied Donetsk Oblast in order to include them in the FEZ.[82] The Resistance Center noted that the Russian government is “siphoning” money from enterprises in the FEZ and warned that prices are rising throughout occupied Ukraine. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky reported on April 23 that the Zaporizhia Iron Ore Plant, one of the largest mining and metallurgical complexes in Ukraine, has entered the FEZ and will receive over 1.85 billion rubles ($20 million) in capital investments as a member of the FEZ.[83] The plant will receive tax benefits and other funds for social and environmental projects. Such funding streams will likely allow Russian occupation authorities more financial control over the plant and its output.

Russian occupation authorities continue to encourage Russians to resettle in occupied Ukraine through employment incentives. Russian opposition investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on April 23 that there is a shortage of doctors, teachers, managers, engineers, and industry specialists in occupied Ukraine, likely in part due to population outflows from occupied areas in the early months of the war, and a reticence amongst residents of occupied areas to work with Russian occupation administrations.[84] Vazhnye Istorii stated that in order to fill labor shortages, Russian occupation officials are offering higher salaries than for the same job in Russia. Vazhnye Istorii found that as of the end of March, the largest Russian job-listing platforms were publishing 800 job vacancies for positions in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, over 6,000 for positions in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and over 12,000 for positions in occupied Crimea.[85] Russian officials are particularly hiring truck drivers and technical engineers, and promising engineers an income of 250,000 rubles compared to the average Russian income of 95,000 rubles. The influx of Russians to occupied Ukraine to staff such jobs is likely in part meant to increase the economic productivity of occupied Ukraine, but also to change the demographic makeup of occupied areas by replacing Ukrainians with Russians, as ISW has previously reported.[86] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko noted, however, that many of the labor migrants attracted to larger occupied cities like Mariupol were initially migrant laborers in Russia before they came to Ukraine and reported that migrants from Central Asian republics face high levels of discrimination and xenophobia from ethnic Russians who have settled in occupied Ukraine.[87] Migrant workers who have arrived in occupied Ukraine due to the promise of high salaries are likely to continue to face unequal treatment and discrimination at the hands of Russians living in occupied Ukraine.

A story by Time details Russia’s persecution of religious minorities, especially Evangelical communities, in occupied Ukraine.[88] Time noted that Ukrainian Protestants represented 34 percent of cases of religious prosecution, 48 percent of which occurred in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast alone, and that Ukrainian Baptists suffered in 13 percent of reported religious persecution cases. ISW has reported at length on Russia’s systemic repression of both Ukrainian Orthodox and Ukrainian Protestant communities in occupied Ukraine and noted that repressions against Protestant communities are particularly intense throughout southern Ukraine.[89]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials and milbloggers continued to promote narratives about the likely provision of US aid to Ukraine, possibly meant to assuage domestic fears in Russia and within the Russian military about the aid’s positive impacts on Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu implied that the US provision of aid to Ukraine will not have an effect on the war and claimed that Russia has shown that Western weapons are not superior to Russian ones and that Ukrainian forces have failed on the battlefield.[90] Russian occupation officials and milbloggers also claimed that US aid will not help Ukraine and that Russian forces are able to combat the US weapons.[91]

Kremlin officials continue efforts to push the West to self-deter and not take actions against Russia. Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko claimed that the Russian State Duma is ready to respond if the West seizes frozen Russian assets and claimed that Western economies will suffer more than the Russian economy.[92]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/37853 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37854 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37855 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37856 ; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-04-23

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/37853 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37854 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37855 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37856 ; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-04-23

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/37853 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37854 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37855 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37856 ; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-04-23

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/37853 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37854 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37855 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37856 ; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-04-23

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-str...

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/37853 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37854 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37855 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37856 ; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-04-23

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-...

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/245329

[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/245329

[17] https://t.me/adelimkhanov_95/2719

[18] https://chechnyatoday dot com/news/371503

[19] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-defence-speech-in...

[20] https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-68880171 ; https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-defence-speech-in...

[21] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-defence-speech-in...

[22] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/curierii-lui-sor-au-adus-de-la-moscova-peste-20-de-milioane-lei-intr-o-singura-zi-banii-destinati-finantarii-partidelor/

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://balkaninsight dot com/2023/09/22/moldova-detains-two-mps-for-taking-bribes-from-fugitive-oligarch/

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042124

[26] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20622877 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/20623129 ; https://www.forbes dot ru/tekhnologii/507108-opasnost-obhoda-cto-mozno-i-nel-za-pisat-o-vpn-servisah-v-internete-s-1-marta

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[28] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/russian-oil-refining-...

[29] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/russian-oil-refining-...

[30] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/russian-oil-refining-...

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[32] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russias-orsk-refinery-resume... https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-22/russian-oil-refining-...

[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032024

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02n5weWZNMy6aUWNhk3J...

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/37847

[37] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/13966

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02n5weWZNMy6aUWNhk3J...

[39] https://t.me/stepnoy_veter/8032 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/8091

[40] https://t.me/brigada92_war/1513; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1782487213919318437; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1782487511673065696; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1782488616603652227; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1782487270957744396

[41] https://t.me/tass_agency/245366

[42] https://t.me/rusich_army/14234 ; https://t.me/batalyon15/4124

[43] https://t.me/philologist_zov/928

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eic4VydWXoUMk5BeS58...

[45] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3855839-na-shodi-situacia-zagostrilasa-vorog-namagaetsa-zahopiti-ivanivske-ta-prorvatisa-v-casiv-ar.html ; https://lb dot ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/186

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121149 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14240 ; ... https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55735

[47] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121149 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14240 ; ...

[48] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/183

[49] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/183

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9866 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22028 ...

[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121121

[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/40646 ; https://t.me/rybar/59418 ; https://t...

[53] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121149 ; https://t.me/sashakots/46250

[54] https://t.me/ssternenko/27805; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1782766376861503623; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1782766382293061876

[55] https://twitter.com/creamy_caprice/status/1782487964787826947; https://...

[56] https://t.me/rybar/59408 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19529 ; https://t.m...

[57] https://t.me/ua_dshv/2435 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/23/syly-oborony-pokazaly-velyku-bytvu-za-novomyhajlivku/

[58] https://t.me/ua_dshv/2435 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/23/syly-oborony-pokazaly-velyku-bytvu-za-novomyhajlivku/

[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/121085?single

[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/8088

[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/40646 ; https://t.me/rybar/59418 ; https://t... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02n5weWZNMy6aUWNhk3J...

[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1798

[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/8093 (Urozhaine) ; https://t.me/voin_dv/8090 (Volodymyrivka)

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eic4VydWXoUMk5BeS58... https://t.me/dva_majors/40646 ; https://t.me/rybar/59418 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19529

[65] https://t.me/tass_agency/245369

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/37851 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40672 (western Zaporizhia Oblast)

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0eic4VydWXoUMk5BeS58... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02n5weWZNMy6aUWNhk3J... ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8560

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/40646 ; https://t.me/rybar/59418

[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/37837 (Kherson direction)

[70] https://t.me/ComAFUA/274 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/13508;

[71] https://t.me/ComAFUA/274 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/13508

[72] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/23/rosiya-atakuvala-odesu-udarnymy-dronamy-postrazhdalo-4-ditej-2-z-yakyh-nemovlyata/ ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/12346

[73] https://suspilne dot media/729949-senat-ssa-golosuvatime-za-dopomogu-ukraini-rosia-raketami-zrujnuvala-televezu-u-harkovi-790-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1713855601&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[74] https://suspilne dot media/729949-senat-ssa-golosuvatime-za-dopomogu-ukraini-rosia-raketami-zrujnuvala-televezu-u-harkovi-790-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1713855601&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/40664

[76] https://t.me/rybar/59434

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[78] https://ria dot ru/20240416/postavschik-1940453556.html ; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/document/0001202404160044

[79] https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1782520802862125104

[80] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20620785

[81] http://kremlin dot ru/acts/news/71513; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6491b23c9a7947e2d216fd94

[82] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/vilni-ekonomichni-zony-na-tot-vilni-dlya-ekonomichnyh-zlochyniv-kremlya/

[83] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/3082

[84] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/stories/2024/04/23/sebe-dorozhe/index.html

[85] https://t.me/istories_media/6107

[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20O...

[87] https://t.me/andriyshTime/20899

[88] https://time.com/6969273/russias-war-against-evangelicals/

[89] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[90] https://t.me/mod_russia/37853 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37854 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37855 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37856 ; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-na-zasedanii-Kollegii-Minoborony-Rossii-04-23

[91] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/35328 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZ...

[92] https://ria dot ru/20240423/aktivy-1941677615.html